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GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS IN BANACH
SPACES: THEORY, NIKAIDO–ISODA-BASED PATH-FOLLOWING
METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS∗
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Abstract. Building upon the results in [M. Hintermüller and T. Surowiec, Pac. J. Optim., 9
(2013), pp. 251–273], a class of noncooperative Nash equilibrium problems is presented, in which the
feasible set of each player is perturbed by the decisions of their competitors via a convex constraint.
In addition, for every vector of decisions, a common “state” variable is given by the solution of an
affine linear equation. The resulting problem is therefore a generalized Nash equilibrium problem
(GNEP). The existence of an equilibrium for this problem is demonstrated, and first-order optimality
conditions are derived under a constraint qualification. An approximation scheme is proposed, which
involves the solution of a parameter-dependent sequence of standard Nash equilibrium problems. An
associated path-following strategy based on the Nikaido–Isoda function is then proposed. Function-
space-based numerics for parabolic GNEPs and a spot-market model are developed.
Key words. generalized Nash equilibrium problem, GNEP, jointly convex, variational equilib-
rium, PDE-constrained optimization, nonsmooth Newton methods, multiobjective PDE-constrained
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1. Introduction. In addition to the many forms of microeconomic models, a va-
riety of design problems in engineering can be modeled by multiobjective optimization
problems; see, e.g., [3] (and the references therein) for problems in electromagnetics
and [28] for applications in aerodynamics. Due to the difficulty of solving multi-
objective problems, some choose to forgo the multiobjective approach completely,
whereas others seek to find Pareto optima by using scalarization methods, e.g., by
considering a weighted sum of the objectives. This leads to a single optimization
problem/cooperative game; see, e.g., [2, pp. 183–184]. In the latter case, one is tasked
with solving a large number of potentially complex problems with the intent of find-
ing the Pareto front. This, however, may not be related to the minimization of the
individual objective functions. Searching instead for a solution vector such that no
individual can deviate from their decision without worsening the objective of at least
one of their competitors leads to the concept of a Nash equilibrium.
By extending some recent advances in the optimal control of partial differential
equations (PDEs) (PDE-con-strained optimization), see, e.g., [16, 29] and the refer-
ences therein, the first two authors of this paper developed a method for calculating
Nash equilibria for classes of PDE-constrained multiobjective optimization problems
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with control and state-constraints in [15], where the PDE took the form of a linear
elliptic equation. In this paper, we use weaker assumptions and generalize the results
in [15] to include a much broader class of infinite-dimensional GNEPs, e.g., parabolic
GNEPs. We extend the usage of variational equilibria to our problem class, and we
devise a path-following scheme by defining a Nikaido–Isoda-based merit function. In
addition, we introduce a type of spot-market model with PDE-constraints.
In the literature, one finds several works concerning PDE-constrained multiob-
jective problems; see, e.g., [4, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28]. However, none of these papers
considers the inclusion of a state constraint. Without such constraints, the models
generally reduce to classical noncooperative games in which the feasible sets of the
individual players are independent of their competitors’ decisions.
Besides the multigrid solver for the discretized problem developed in [4], the only
convergent function-space-based method for PDE-constrained multiobjective prob-
lems is currently the one developed in [15]. We extend this method to include a class
of parabolic GNEPs, and we propose a generalized projected gradient method for
GNEPs to solve the spot market problem.
Our path-following approach differs from the more recently developed techniques
based on either Moreau–Yosida-type regularization, see, e.g., [12, 13], or Lavrentiev-
type regularization, see, e.g., [18], or using interior point methods, see, e.g., [14, 27, 30].
Indeed, these concepts were developed for classical PDE-constrained optimal control
problems (with a single objective). Due to the definition of a solution (Nash equilib-
rium) and the presence of competing objectives, a direct extension to multiobjective
Nash equilibrium problems with PDE-constraints is therefore not possible. Since the
well-known Nikaido–Isoda function for a Nash equilibrium problem couples these ob-
jectives, it is a good candidate for defining a merit function; as such, it serves as the
basis for our path-following concept.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce the general frame-
work, a few characteristic examples, and we provide necessary and sufficient first-
order optimality conditions in the form of classical KKT conditions as well as with
the help of the Nikaido–Isoda function. In section 3, we highlight the concept of
variational equilibria, which allows us to focus our efforts toward the calculation
of a specific kind of equilibrium. Since the multiplier associated with the state con-
straint is typically of low regularity, we present in section 4 an approximation method,
in which the original problem is approximated by a sequence of (directly solvable)
parameter-dependent Nash equilibrium problems. This leads to the concept of paths
of equilibria. Under a constraint qualification of Slater-type, boundedness of a path
of equilibria is demonstrated and the convergence of (weak) accumulation points to
variational equilibria for the original problem is shown. We then build upon these
results by developing a path-following strategy. This strategy employs a nonsmooth
value function for which a sensitivity result is derived in order to obtain an analyt-
ical update formula for the path-parameter. In section 5.1, we extend the method
from [15] to the solution of a class of parabolic GNEPs. In section 5.2, inspired by
the behavior in natural gas spot markets, we consider a model GNEP, which de-
scribes noncooperative economic behavior coupled by complex processes including a
viscosity-regularized transport equation. We derive first-order optimality conditions
and propose a new numerical method. The algorithmic approaches are illustrated by
numerical tests.
2. Preliminary results. In this section, we set the general framework for our
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tion 2.2. Finally, we derive optimality conditions and characterizing relations for
equilibria in section 2.3.
2.1. General problem setting. Throughout this paper, we consider an N -
player noncooperative game in which the ith player considers the following problem:
(Pi)
minimize J1i (y) + J
2
i (ui) over (ui, y) ∈ Ui × Y
subject to (s.t.)
Ay = B(ui, u−i),
ui ∈ U iad,
y ∈ K
for i = 1, . . . , N . Note that we use the typical convention (ui, u−i) = u ∈ U to
emphasize the ith component and denote the components of u with the exception
of ui by the subscript −i. For some nonempty subset C ⊂ X , IC : X → R ∪
{+∞} represents the standard indicator function. Strong convergence of a sequence
is denoted by →, weak-convergence by ⇀, and weak-∗-convergence by ∗⇀. The closed
ε-ball with center x is denoted Bε(x). The superscript ∗ is used to denote the adjoint
operator or dual space. For a closed, nonempty, and convex set M in a Banach space
Z, we define the classical convex normal cone by
NM (z) :=
{ {z∗ ∈ Z∗ |〈z∗, z′ − z〉 ≤ 0 ∀z′ ∈M } , z ∈M,
∅, else.
We invoke the following data assumptions throughout.
Assumption 2.1.
1. Ui (i = 1, . . . , N) are reflexive separable Banach spaces, Y,W are reflexive
Banach spaces, and X is a Banach space, each endowed with the norm topol-
ogy.
2. The embedding Y ↪→ X is continuous.
3. If some arbitrary set M ⊂ X∗ is bounded, then M is weak-∗ relatively com-
pact in X∗ (e.g., X is separable or reflexive cf. [5]).
4. U := ΠNi=1Ui is endowed with the usual box topology.
5. A is a linear isomorphism from Y to W .
6. B is a bounded linear operator from U to W , i.e., B ∈ L(U,W ). We can
write Bu =
∑m
i=1 Biui with Bi = B(·, 0−i) bounded linear operators from Ui
to W , i.e., Bi ∈ L(Ui,W ).
7. A−1B : U → X is compact.
8. K ⊂ X is a nonempty, closed, and convex set.
9. The norm topology on X allows for the existence of x ∈ K and ε > 0 such
that Bε(x) ⊂ K.
10. U iad ⊂ Ui is nonempty, bounded, closed, and convex; and Uad := ΠNi=1U iad.
11. There exists a u ∈ Uad with A−1Bu ∈ K.
12. J1i : Y → R is convex and completely continuous, and J2i : Ui → R is strictly
convex and continuous. In particular, if vk
Y
⇀ v, then J1i (vk) → J1i (v).
Note that the separability assumption for the objective is not essential for our
analysis and that a larger class of objectives could be used provided they satisfy suit-
able assumptions. Since our examples, which already cover a broad range of applica-
tions, are of this form, we prefer to forgo the additional assumptions and abstractions.
The overall noncooperative game will be referred to as (P). Moreover, we often
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also write (Pi) in reduced form:
minimizeJi(ui, u−i) := J1i (S(ui, u−i)) + J2i (ui) over ui ∈ Ui
s.t.
ui ∈ U iad, S(ui, u−i) ∈ K.
Due to the dependence on the decision vector u−i in the feasible set of (Pi), this type
of game is often referred to as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). The
current setting allows us to consider a wide array of problems, including GNEPs in
which the feasible set is governed by a PDE.
Note that for u ∈ U , the strategy ui is feasible for (Pi), given u−i, for all i =
1, . . . , N if and only if u ∈ C, where
C := {u ∈ Uad | Su ∈ K}.
Since C is convex, our problem has the structure of a so-called jointly convex GNEP.
We now state our desired solution concept.
Definition 2.2. A point ū ∈ C is referred to as a Nash equilibrium provided the
following inequality holds:
(1) Ji(ūi, ū−i) ≤ Ji(vi, ū−i) ∀vi ∈ Ui : (vi, ū−i) ∈ C ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
2.2. Examples. As stated above, our rather general framework allows for ap-
plications of GNEPs with PDEs. For illustration purposes, we first highlight a GNEP
governed by an elliptic state equation and then one with a parabolic state equation.
Note that a.e. Ω means “almost everywhere on Ω with respect to the Lebesgue mea-
sure.”
Example 2.3. Consider a GNEP in which (Pi) is defined by
minimize 12 ||Kiy − yid||2L2(Ω) + αi2 ||ui||2L2(Ω) over (ui, y) ∈ L2(Ω)×W 1,r0 (Ω)
s.t.
−Δy = ∑Ni=1 χΩiui in W−1,r(Ω),
ai ≤ ui ≤ bi, a.e. Ω,
y ≤ ψ in Ω.
Here, we have the following:
• Ω ⊂ Rd, d ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is an open bounded subset, and ∂Ω is sufficiently
regular.
• Ui = L2(Ω), Y =W 1,r0 (Ω), W =W−1,r(Ω), r > max(d, 2), X = C(Ω).
• A = −Δ, Bu = ∑Ni=1 χΩiui, where Ωi ⊂ Ω for each i, and χΩi : Rd → {0, 1}
is the standard characteristic function.
• ai, bi ∈ L2(Ω), with ai ≤ bi, a.e. Ω.
• yid ∈ L2(Ω), αi > 0, ψ ∈W 1,r0 (Ω), ψ|∂Ω > 0.
• U iad :=
{
v ∈ L2(Ω) |ai ≤ v ≤ bi, a.e. Ω
}
.
• K := ψ + C(Ω)−, where C(Ω)− is the cone of nonpositive continuous func-
tions.
• J1i (y) := 12 ||Kiy − yid||2L2(Ω) with Ki ∈ L(Y, L2(Ω)) for each i, and J2i (ui) :=
αi
2 ||ui||2L2(Ω).
Here, L2(Ω) and W 1,r0 (Ω) denote the standard Lebesgue and Sobolev spaces; see,
e.g., [1]. Furthermore, W−1,r(Ω) represents the topological dual space of W 1,s0 (Ω)
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Another interesting class of examples involves the optimal control of a linear
parabolic PDE with control and state constraints, which we write in reduced form (as
opposed to the form used in Example 2.3).
Example 2.4. Let y = Su for u ∈ L2(0, T ;L2(Ω))N solve the initial boundary
value problem
yt −Δy + c0y = Bu in Q = Ω× (0, T ),
y = 0 on Σ = Γ× (0, T ),
y(·, 0) = 0 in Ω,
where Ω ⊂ Rd, d ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is open and bounded with Lipschitz boundary Γ, T > 0
(a scalar), Q := Ω × (0, T ), Σ := Γ × (0, T ), c0 ∈ L∞(Q) with c0 ≥ 0 a.e. Q. We
consider a GNEP in which (Pi) is defined as
(2)
minimize 12 ||KiS(ui, u−i)− yid||2L2(Q) + αi2 ||ui||2L2(Q) over ui ∈ L2(Q)
s.t.
ai ≤ ui ≤ bi, a.e. Q, S(ui, u−i) ≤ ψ in Q.
Here, we consider the settings:
• Ui = L2(Q), Y =
{
y ∈ L2(0, T ;H10 (Ω) ∩H2(Ω))
∣∣yt ∈ L2(Q)}, W = L2(Q)×
H10 (Ω), X = C(Q).
• Ay = (yt −Δy + c0y, y(0)), B ∈ L(L2(Q)).
• ψ ∈ Y , ψ|∂Ω > 0.
• ai, bi ∈ L2(Q), ai ≤ bi, a.e. Q.
• yid ∈ L2(Q), αi > 0.
• U iad :=
{
v ∈ L2(Q) |ai ≤ v ≤ bi, a.e. Q
}
.
• K = ψ+C(Q)−, where C(Q)− is the cone of nonpositive continuous functions
on Q.
• Ji(u) = 12 ||KiS(ui, u−i) − yid||2L2(L2) + αi2 ||ui||2L2(L2) with Ki ∈ L(Y, L2(Q))
for each i.
Here, L2(0, T ;X) denotes the standard Bochner space of square integrable functions
with values in a Banach space X ; see, e.g., [9].
2.3. Optimality conditions for generalized Nash equilibria. The question
of existence of a Nash equilibrium is postponed to section 3, where we concentrate
on a specific class of equilibria that can be computed numerically. Nevertheless, in
the interest of contrasting the difference between variational equilibria and all other
equilibria, we provide the following results.
Theorem 2.5 (first-order conditions for Nash equilibria). If a Nash equilibrium
ū ∈ U of (P) satisfies
∀i = 1, . . . , N, ∃ui ∈ U iad : Bε(0) ⊂ S(ui, ū−i)−K(3)
for some ε > 0, then there exists ȳ ∈ Y , p̄ ∈ (W ∗)N , λ̄ ∈ U∗, and μ̄ ∈ (X∗)N such
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is fulfilled for i = 1, . . . , N . The coupled system is denoted by (OS). Conversely, if
the tuple (ū, ȳ, p̄, λ̄, μ̄) ∈ U × Y × (W ∗)N × U∗ × (X∗)N satisfies the coupled system
(OS), then ū is a Nash equilibrium.
The constraint qualification (3) requires the existence of a Slater point for each
individual problem (Pi) at the solution. Later, we will work only with variational
equilibria, where only a Slater point for the entire problem is required (see section 3).
Proof. By definition, ū is a Nash equilibrium if and only if ūi solves
minimizeJi(ui, ū−i) + IUiad (ui) + IK(S(ui, ū−i)) over ui ∈ Ui.
By convexity, this is equivalent to
0 ∈ ∂
(
Ji(·, ū−i) + IUiad(·) + IK(S(·, ū−i))
)
(ūi),(4)
where ∂ denotes the standard subdifferential from convex analysis; cf. [17]. Note that
by (3), ui → IK(S(ui, ū−i)) has a continuity point. Since Ji is continuous, we can
apply the sum rule for convex subdifferentials, cf., e.g., [17, Chapter 4, section 4.2,
Theorem 1], and obtain
∂
(
Ji(·, ū−i) + IUiad (·) + IK(S(·, ū−i))
)
(ūi)
= ∂Ji(·, ū−i)(ūi) +NUiad(ūi) + ∂IK(S(·, ū−i))(ūi).
By continuity of J1i , we can apply the chain rule for convex subdifferentials, cf.,
e.g., [17, Chapter 4, section 4.2, Theorem 2] and obtain
∂Ji(·, ū−i)(ūi) = B∗i A−∗∂J1i (Sū) + ∂J2i (ūi),
∂IK(S(·, ū−i))(ūi) = B∗i A−∗NK(Sū).
Thus, (4), can be written as









[Ji(ui, u−i)− Ji(vi, u−i)] .
In addition, define V : C → R by
V (u) = max
v
{Ψ(u, v) | v ∈ U : (vi, u−i) ∈ C for i = 1, . . . , N}.
Choosing v = u, we infer that V (u) ≥ Ψ(u, u) = 0 for u ∈ C. The function V plays
an essential role throughout the text. Moreover, it leads to the following convenient
characterization of Nash equilibria.
Lemma 2.6. A point ū ∈ U is a Nash equilibrium of (P) if and only if ū ∈ C and
V (ū) = 0.
Proof. This is essentially Lemma 3.1 in [20].
3. Variational equilibria. As mentioned above, we focus our attention on a
specific class of equilibria that can be more readily computed as compared to the
computation of Nash equilibria via the solution of the coupled system (OS). In essence,
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3.1. Essential results and observations. Since (P) is a jointly convex GNEP,
we can use the more restrictive solution concept of variational equilibria, which was
first introduced in [24] (as normalized equilibria in a slightly different form) and is
nowadays widely used for (finite-dimensional) games; see, e.g., the survey paper [6].
We note that the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.9, and Lemma 3.3 can be directly
adapted from their finite-dimensional analogues; see in particular, Theorems 3.2 and
3.5 in [6]. As such, we present them without proof here.
Our definition of variational equilibria is based on the Nikaido–Isoda function Ψ
defined above and the functions R̂ : C → C defined by
R̂(u) := argmax
v





Ji(vi, u−i) | v ∈ C
}
and V̂ : C → R defined by
V̂ (u) := Ψ(u, R̂(u)) = max
v
{Ψ(u, v) | v ∈ C} .
Note that R̂ and thus V̂ are well defined since C is nonempty, bounded, closed, and
convex, and v → Ψ(u, v) is continuous and strictly concave (thus upper semicontinu-
ous) for fixed u ∈ U . Note that the parameter u in the definition of V perturbs both
the objective and feasible set; in V̂ , u only perturbs the objective. Obviously, we have
V̂ (u) ≥ Ψ(u, u) = 0 for all u ∈ C.
Definition 3.1. A point ū ∈ U is called a variational equilibrium of (P) if ū ∈ C
and V̂ (ū) = 0.
Note that variational equilibria and Nash equilibria are the same for an NEP (e.g.,
in our setting K = Y ) by Lemma 2.6. As in these cases, there is no difference between
V̂ and V . For our general jointly convex GNEP, we have the following relation.
Theorem 3.2 (variational equilibria are Nash equilibria). Every variational
equilibrium of (P) is also a Nash equilibrium of (P).
The following lemma characterizes variational equilibria as fixed points of R̂.
Lemma 3.3. A point ū ∈ C is a variational equilibrium if and only if ū = R̂(ū).
Theorem 3.4 (existence of a variational equilibrium). The GNEP (P) admits a
variational equilibrium ū ∈ U .
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, it suffices to show that R̂ : C → C has a fixed point.
To apply the fixed point theorem of Kakutani, we take R̂ as a set-valued mapping.
Let Z := U be endowed with the weak topology. Then C ⊆ Z is nonempty, convex,
and compact. Clearly, R̂(u) is nonempty, convex, and closed for all u ∈ C. To show
sequential upper semicontinuity, suppose that (uk)k∈N ⊆ C such that uk Z→ u∗, and
let vk ∈ R̂(uk), such that vk Z→ v∗. Since J1i , J2i are convex and continuous, they are
lower semicontinuous on Z. Moreover, zk ∈ U with zk Z→ z implies S(zk) Y⇀ S(z). It
follows then by the assumptions on J1i that for all v ∈ C,
N∑
i=1
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This implies v∗ ∈ R̂(u∗). By the separability of Z, the weak topology on C
is metrizable, and thus we have shown the sequential upper semicontinuity of R̂.
By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point of R̂, as was to be
shown.
Remark 3.5. Note that the strict convexity of J2i is not used in the previous proof.
This allows us to argue in section 5.2 that the spot market model has a variational
equilibrium.
From Theorems 3.2 and 3.4, one directly infers the following.
Corollary 3.6 (existence of Nash equilibria). The GNEP (P) admits a Nash
equilibrium ū ∈ U .
By studying the first-order system for variational equilibria, we can get a better
understanding of the relation to Nash equilibria. In what follows, we will need some
constraint qualification of Slater type: We will say that the GNEP (P) satisfies the
Slater condition if
0 ∈ int (S(Uad)−K) ,
where the interior is taken in the space X . Note that this constraint qualification is
much weaker than the one used for the characterization of Nash equilibria in Theo-
rem 2.5.
Theorem 3.7 (first-order conditions for variational equilibria). Suppose that the
Slater condition is satisfied. Then a point ū ∈ U is a variational equilibrium of (P)












0 ∈ ∂J2i (ūi)−B∗i p̄i + λ̄i
is fulfilled for each i = 1, . . . , N . The coupled system is referred to by (ÔS).
Remark 3.8. A comparison with Theorem 2.5 shows that (under a constraint
qualification) a Nash equilibrium ū is a variational equilibrium if and only if for the
associated multipliers μ̄i ∈ X∗, we have μ̄1 = · · · = μ̄N . This observation links
variational equilibria to the normalized equilibria as defined by Rosen [24], where the
μ̄i are only allowed to differ by a scalar factor ri > 0.





Ji(vi, ū−i) + IC(v) over v ∈ U.
Due to convexity, this is equivalent to 0 ∈ ∂(∑Ni=1 Ji((·)i, ū−i) + IC(·))(ū). Since the
Ji, i = 1, . . . , N , are continuous, we can apply the sum rule for convex subdifferentials,
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where ∂i denotes the convex subdifferential with respect to the ith variable. Indeed,
u∗ ∈ ∂(Ji((·)i, ū−i))(ū) implies
(6) Ji(u′i, ū−i) ≥ Ji(ū) + 〈u∗, u′ − ū〉U∗,U ∀u′ ∈ U.
Then for u′ = (ūi, ū−i + v) ∈ U with v ∈ U−i arbitrary, we have
0 ≥ 〈u∗, (0i, v)〉U∗,U = 〈u∗−i, v〉U∗−i,U−i ∀v ∈ U−i.
Hence, u∗−i = 0−i. But then (6) yields
Ji(u′i, ū−i) ≥ Ji(ū) + 〈u∗i , u′i − ūi〉U∗i ,Ui ∀u′i ∈ Ui.
Therefore, u∗i ∈ ∂iJi(·, ū−i)(ūi). This yields u∗ = (u∗i , 0−i). The converse follows by
substitution, in which case u∗ ∈ ∂ (Ji((·)i, ū−i)) (ū) if and only if u∗ = (u∗i , 0−i) with
u∗i ∈ ∂iJi(·, ū−i)(ūi). In order to see that the (Minkowski) sum of the subdifferen-
tials equals the product in (5), take u∗ ∈ ∑Ni=1 ∂ (Ji((·)i, ū−i)) (ū). By the previous





i , 0−i) = (u
∗




i=1(∂iJi(·, ū−i))(ūi). By simply reversing
this argument we obtain equality.
By the continuity of J1i , we can apply the chain rule for convex subdifferentials,
cf., e.g., [17, Chapter 4, section 4.2, Theorem 2], and obtain
(∂iJi(·, ū−i))(ūi) = B∗iA−∗∂J1i (Sū) + ∂J2i (ūi).





allows us to apply the chain rule for convex subdifferentials to obtain
NC(u) = NUad(u) + S∗NK(Su) ∀u ∈ U,
where we recall that S := A−1B is a bounded linear operator, and hence S∗ is well
defined. Moreover, cf., e.g., [2, section 4.6],
NUad(u) = N∏Ni=1 Uiad(u) =
N∏
i=1
NUiad(ui) ∀u ∈ U.
Hence, we may write every ν ∈ NC(u) as ν = λ + S∗μ with λ = (λi)i=1,...,N , λi ∈
NUiad(ui), and μ ∈ NK(Su). Inserting this into (5) and reading it componentwise, we
get the equivalent formulation
0 ∈ B∗i A−∗∂J1i (Sū) + ∂J2i (ūi) + λ̄i +B∗iA−∗μ̄ ∀i = 1, . . . , N
with λ̄i ∈ NUiad(ui) and μ̄ ∈ NK(Sū). This yields the assertion.
If the objectives are continuously Gâteaux-differentiable, i.e., the directional deriva-
tives are continuous and linear in the direction, then variational equilibria can be
characterized as solutions of an associated variational inequality. Frequently, this
characterization is even taken as the definition of variational equilibria. For the
remainder of this section, we assume that J1i , J
2
i , i = 1, . . . , N , are continuously





′(Su) + (J2i )
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and consider the variational inequality VI(C,F), i.e., the problem of finding ū ∈ C
with
(7) 〈F (ū), u− ū〉U∗,U ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ C.
We call VI(C,F) the associated variational inequality to (P).
Theorem 3.9 (variational equilibria as solutions of the associated VI). A point
ū ∈ U is a variational equilibrium of (P) if and only if it is a solution of the associated
variational inequality.
3.2. A special case: Reduction to a single control problem. We consider
a situation in which the state-dependent part of the players’ objectives differ only
by a linear-affine functional. In such a case, the task of calculating a variational
equilibrium for the GNEP can be reduced to a more tractable optimization problem
with a single objective.
For the remainder of this section, we replace the assumptions on J1i by
• J1i = J10 + J̃1i , where J10 is convex and continuously Gâteaux differentiable,
and J̃1i is linear-affine; without loss of generality, we assume that J̃
1
i ∈ Y ∗.








‖y − ydi ‖2L2 =
1
2




Proposition 3.10. Under the above assumption, there exists a unique varia-
tional equilibrium ū of (P), which is the unique solution of the convex optimization
problem




J2i (ui) + 〈S∗i J̃1i , ui〉U∗i ,Ui
)
over u ∈ U.
s.t. u ∈ C.
Proof. Since C is convex and Ĵ is convex and continuously Gâteaux differentiable,
ũ ∈ C is a global minimizer of Ĵ if and only if
〈Ĵ ′(ũ), u− ũ〉U∗,U ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ C.
Moreover, since the components of Ĵ ′ coincide with those of F , we see that ũ is
a global minimizer if and only if ũ solves (7). It follows then from Theorem 3.9
that ũ is a variational equilibrium. The uniqueness follows from the strict convexity
of Ĵ .
Thus, we have reduced the problem of finding a variational equilibrium to the
(theoretically and numerically) better understood solution of an optimization problem
with a single objective.
Finally, we remark that since a continuously Gâteaux differentiable monotone
operator Φ : X → X∗ on a Banach space X is a potential operator if and only if
Φ′(x) is self-adjoint for all x ∈ X , our reduction procedure is valid if and only if it has
the special structure considered in this subsection and J1i , J
2
i are twice continuously
Gâteaux differentiable.
Remark 3.11 (relation to potential games). Given some (ui, u−i), (v, u−i) ∈ C,
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〈S∗i J̃1i , v〉U∗i ,Ui + J2i (v)). Hence, Ĵ (u) − Ĵ (v, u−i) > 0 if and only if J10 (Su) +
〈S∗i J̃1i , ui〉U∗i ,Ui + J2i (ui) − (J10 (S(v, u−i)) + 〈S∗i J̃1i , v〉U∗i ,Ui + J2i (v)) > 0. Therefore,
Ĵ satisfies the conditions of an exact potential; cf. [19] or see [7, Definition 2.1(b)].
Moreover, the construction of C here fits into the generalization of potential games
found in [7, Definition 2.1(a)]. This implies that the variational equilibrium problem
is equivalent to a generalized potential game.
4. Calculating variational equilibria. In most applications, both J1i and J
2
i
will be at least continuously Gâteaux differentiable, whereas U iad is typically composed
of box constraints on the various controls. However, as the state constraint Su ∈ K
must be understood in X , often an infinite-dimensional function space whose topol-
ogy allows pointwise constraint systems to have nonempty interiors, the associated
multiplier is often only a type of measure, e.g., as in Examples 2.3 and 2.4 above. As
a consequence, the complementarity condition associated with μ̄ ∈ ∂IK(ȳ) cannot be
rewritten in a way amenable to efficient numerical solvers. Thus, although we have
both existence of an equilibrium and optimality conditions, we still need to address
the issue of developing a robust (mesh-independent) numerical solution method.
4.1. Approximating the GNEP. Since the state constraint is the source of
many difficulties, we replace it by a parameter-dependent penalty term in the indi-
vidual objectives. In our setting, this leads coincidentally to a classical NEP. Solving
the NEP requires the solution of a variational inequality of the type
〈Fγ(ũ), u− ũ〉 ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ Uad.
Though Uad may be a “nice” set with concrete structure, Fγ(ũ) is not necessarily
strongly monotone. In fact, there is no reason why Fγ should even be monotone.
This greatly complicates numerical efforts. Throughout the coming discussion, we
invoke the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 4.1.
1. J1i and J
2
i , i = 1, . . . , N , are continuously Gâteaux differentiable with bounded
Gâteaux derivatives (J1i )
′ : Y → Y ∗ and (J2i )′ : Ui → U∗i , i.e., they map
bounded sets into bounded sets.
2. (J1i )
′ is completely continuous, i.e., (J1i )
′(yn) Y
∗→ (J1i )′(y) whenever yn Y⇀ y.
3. (J2i )






′ has the property 〈(J2i )′(u∗i ), u∗i 〉U∗i ,Ui ≤ lim supn→∞〈(J2i )′(uni ), uni 〉U∗i ,Ui
whenever uni
Ui⇀ ui.
5. β : X → R+ is convex, continuous, and continuously Gâteaux-differentiable
with kerβ = K, i.e., β(y) = 0 whenever y ∈ K, otherwise β(y) > 0.
These assumptions on J1i and J
2
i are satisfied for the objectives in Examples 2.3
and 2.4. Also note that the assumptions on β are satisfied when β (multiplied by
a positive scalar γ) arises from the Moreau–Yosida regularization of the indicator
function IK .
For each γ > 0 and i = 1, . . . , N , we approximate (Pi) by
(Pi,γ)
minimize J1i (y) + J
2
i (ui) + γβ(y) over (ui, y) ∈ Ui × Y
s.t.
Ay = B(ui, u−i),
ui ∈ U iad.
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identical arguments to those which were applied for (P), one demonstrates the ex-
istence of an equilibrium for every γ > 0. Moreover, the first-order necessary and
sufficient optimality conditions are of the following form: For all i = 1, . . . , N , uγ is
a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exist yγ ∈ Y , pγ ∈ (W ∗)N , λγ ∈ U∗, and
μγ ∈ X∗ such that
(OSi,γ)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩











0 = (J2i )
′(uγi )−B∗i pγi + λγi .
The coupled system is denoted by (OSγ). Note that no constraint qualification is
required to derive the optimality conditions.
4.2. The primal-dual path and its properties. Our aim now is to show the
convergence of stationary points of OSγ to a solution of (P). Since (Pγ) does not have
a unique solution in general, we have to consider boundedness of selections of paths
of stationary points of (Pγ).
Definition 4.2. For γ > 0, denote by Sγ ⊆ U × Y × (W ∗)N × U∗ ×X∗ the set
of solutions of (OSγ) and set
C :=
{(
(uγ , yγ , pγ , λγ , μγ)
)
γ>0
| ∀γ > 0 : (uγ , yγ , pγ , λγ , μγ) ∈ Sγ
}
.
We call every element C = ((uγ , yγ , pγ , λγ , μγ))γ>0 ∈ C a primal-dual path.
The following lemma provides the boundedness of a primal-dual path.
Lemma 4.3. If (P) fulfills the Slater condition, then there exists a positive con-
stant ρ <∞ such that for all γ > 0, (uγ , yγ , pγ , λγ , μγ) ∈ Sγ , satisfies
‖uγ‖U + ‖yγ‖Y + ‖pγ‖(W∗)N + ‖λγ‖U∗ + ‖μγ‖X∗ ≤ ρ.
Proof. Since uγi ∈ U iad, we have
‖uγ‖U ≤ Cu <∞(8)
for some Cu > 0 by the boundedness of U
i
ad. This immediately implies the bounded-
ness of yγ , since
‖yγ‖Y ≤ ‖S‖U→YCu <∞.(9)
The assumptions on β and μγ = γβ′(yγ) imply for z ∈ K,
0 = γβ(z) ≥ γβ(yγ) + 〈μγ , z − yγ〉X∗,X ≥ 〈μγ , z − yγ〉X∗,X .
By the Slater condition, there exists an ε > 0 and u0 ∈ Uad such that
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Fixing an arbitrary z ∈ Bε(0) ⊆ X , we have
〈μγ , z〉X∗,X = 〈μγ , Su0 + z〉X∗,X − 〈μγ , Su0〉X∗,X












〈(J2i )′(uγi ) +B∗i A−∗(J1i )′(yγ), u0i − uγi 〉U∗i ,Ui
≤ C0 <∞
for some C0 > 0. Here, we used the second equation in (OSγ) together with S = A
−1B




‖μγ‖X∗ = 1ε sup{〈μγ , z〉X∗,X | z ∈ Bε(0)} ≤ 1εC0 =: Cμ <∞
The boundedness of pγ now follows from
‖pγi ‖W∗ = ‖A−∗((J1i )′(yγ) + μγ)‖W∗ ≤ Cip <∞
for some positive Cip. Furthermore, we infer
‖λi‖U∗i = ‖B∗i pγi − (J2i )′(uγi )‖U∗i ≤ Ciλ,
for some positive constant Ciλ. This concludes the proof.
The following main result of this section establishes convergence of uγ to a vari-
ational equilibrium of (P).
Theorem 4.4 (limits of primal-dual paths). If (P) fulfills the Slater condition,
then for every primal-dual path C ∈ C there exists a sequence γn → ∞ such that
uγn
U
⇀ u∗, yγn Y⇀ y∗, pγn
(W∗)N





Moreover, the point (u∗, y∗, p∗, λ∗, μ∗) fulfills the first-order optimality conditions (ÔS),
in particular, u∗ is a variational equilibrium of (P).
Proof. Let C = (uγ , yγ , pγ , λγ , μγ)γ>0 ∈ C be a primal-dual path. Then C is
uniformly bounded in γ by Lemma 4.3. The first assertion follows readily by assump-
tion, since U, Y,W ∗ are reflexive Banach spaces and bounded sets in X∗ are weakly∗
sequentially compact.
Note that every element of the primal-dual-path fulfills the optimality system
system (OSγn). This immediately yields Ay
∗ = Bu∗. Since B∗i A
−∗(J1i )
′ : Y → U∗
and B∗i A
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The assumption on (J2i )
′ and (OSγ) yield for all ui ∈ U iad
〈−B∗i p∗i + (J2i )′(u∗i ), u∗i 〉U∗i ,Ui ≤ lim sup
n→∞
〈−B∗i pγni + (J2i )′(uγni ), uγni 〉U∗i ,Ui
≤ lim sup
n→∞
〈−B∗i pγni + (J2i )′(uγni ), ui〉U∗i ,Ui
= 〈−B∗i p∗i + (J2i )′(u∗i ), ui〉U∗i ,Ui ,
i.e., B∗i p
∗
i − (J2i )′(u∗i ) ∈ NUiad(u∗i ). We then deduce the existence of a λ̄i ∈ NUiad(u∗i )





i − (J2i )′(uγni )
U∗i⇀ B∗i p
∗
i − (J2i )′(u∗i ) = λ̄i.
Since the weak limit is unique, we have λ̄i = λ
∗
i for all i = 1, . . . , N , and thus
λ∗ ∈ NUiad(u∗i ). The Slater condition implies in particular that there exists a feasible
point u0 ∈ C. Thus, we have
0 ≤ γnβ(yγn) ≤ γnβ(Su0)− γ〈β′(yγn), Su0 − yγn〉X∗,X = −〈μγn , Su0 − yγn〉X∗,X .
The boundedness of (μγn)n∈N and (yγn)n∈N implies the boundedness of γnβ(yγn), and
regarding γn → ∞ we can conclude that β(yγn) → 0. Since uγn U⇀ u∗, S is compact
from U to X , and β is continuous; this yields β(y∗) = 0, and hence y∗ ∈ K.
Since β is convex and differentiable, its derivative is (maximal) monotone. More-
over, for all z ∈ K, β(z) = 0 is a minimizer, which implies β′(z) = 0. It follows then
that
〈β′(yγn)− β′(z), yγn − z〉X∗,X = 〈β′(yγn), yγn − z〉X∗,X ≥ 0.
This yields 〈μγn , z − yγn〉X∗,X ≤ 0 for all z ∈ K. Passing to the limit, in light of the
compactness of S from U to X , yields 〈μ∗, z − y∗〉X∗,X ≤ 0 for all z ∈ K. It follows
then that μ∗ ∈ NK(y∗).
4.3. Nikaido–Isoda-based path-following. The general path-following strat-
egy of [12, 13] for PDE-constrained optimization problems with state-constraints uses
the optimal value function V (γ) of the reduced problem as a merit function. When
no control constraints are present, one can often find or approximate first and second
derivatives of V (γ). These are then used to develop a model of the merit function,
whose values dictate the update strategy for γ.
The current game-theoretic/multiobjective setting poses two immediate difficul-
ties: (i) each player has their own optimal value function; (ii) the presence of control
constraints prohibits the derivation of similar (continuous) differentiability results.
Minimizing a weighted sum of the reduced objectives subject to the individual
control constraints would lead to a parameter tuning related to the Pareto-optimality
of the current solution. As we are considering (generalized) Nash equilibria, another
concept is necessary.




[J γi (ui, u−i)− J γi (vi, u−i)] ,
where J γi (u) := J1i (Su) + J2i (u) + γβ(Su) represents the objective of (Pi,γ), and
consider V : U × R+ → R defined by
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One immediately observes that V (u, γ) ≥ 0 for all u ∈ Uad and that analogously to
Lemma 2.6, we have
V (u, γ) = 0 if and only if u is an equilibrium.
The latter property leads to the development of an update strategy for γ. Indeed,
suppose for γ > 0 that uγ is a corresponding Nash equilibrium. Then, as observed
above, V (uγ , γ) = 0. Since we will be using a locally convergent numerical solution
method in which γ → +∞ and uγ serves as the starting point for the problem with








′ if necessary, until V (uγ , γ′) drops
below a certain threshold. Such a strategy would be highly impractical as each mini-
mization problem requires the solution of a system of N PDEs for the state, N PDEs
for the adjoint state, and N variational inequalities for the controls.
Letting V(γ + η) := V (uγ , γ + η), η > 0, and assuming that the directional
derivative V ′(γ, η) exists, we observe that V(γ + tη) = V(γ) + V ′(γ; tη) + o(t) =
V ′(γ; tη) + o(t). Therefore, we can base an alternative strategy either directly on
V ′(γ; η) or an efficient approximation thereof. In fact, we will only investigate the
behavior of secants of V . Using such an approach, one could easily extend this concept
to settings in which V ′(γ; η) does not necessarily exist or where vγ is not unique.
Indeed, the crucial upper-bound derived in (11) below only requires vγ+tη ∈ Uad to
be feasible for the problem associated with V(γ) and that vγ is any global minimizer
of the objective.
Although an explicit form for V ′ may be derived, its computation might be ex-
pensive. We therefore provide upper and lower bounds on the difference quotients
t−1(V(γ + tη) − V(γ)), which only use information that is available at the time of
updating γ.
Theorem 4.5. For any γ > 0, let uγ be the corresponding equilibrium and define
V(γ + η) := V (uγ , γ + η), η > 0. It holds that
ηNβ(S(uγ)) ≥ lim sup
t↓0
t−1(V(γ + tη)− V(γ))(10)
≥ lim inf
t↓0
t−1(V(γ + tη)− V(γ)) ≥ 0 ∀η > 0.
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and we make the following observation:



























J γ+tηi (vγ+tηi , uγ−i)−
N∑
i=1






J γ+tηi (vγ+tηi , uγ−i)−
N∑
i=1









ηNβ(S(uγ)) ≥ lim sup
t↓0
t−1(V(γ + tη)− V(γ)),
as was to be shown.
Recalling the discussion preceding Theorem 4.5, we see that V(γ + η) can be
approximated from above by the term ηNβ(S(uγ)). Of course, if β(S(uγ)) = 0, then
there is no need to increase γ, as the current state yγ is feasible. This in turn means
that we have found a Nash equilibrium. If we assume that the state constraint is
not redundant, then we can bound the secants by a fixed threshold πpath > 0 and by
choosing η > 0 such that
ηNβ(S(uγ)) ≤ πpath.




and then use the update γ := γ + η. In such a case, the γ update is inversely
proportional to the violation of the state constraint. This leads to the following
general update strategy.
Algorithm 1. Nikaido–Isoda-based path-following for GNEPs.
Input: γ, πpath, ε > 0.
1: Solve (OSγ) to obtain u
γ .
2: while β(S(uγ)) > 0 do
3: Set η := max(πpath/Nβ(S(u
γ)), ε).
4: Set γ := γ + η.
5: Solve (OSγ) to obtain u
γ .
6: end while
Algorithm 1 yields γ → +∞, which in turn implies convergence of the path-
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order of machine precision. Solving (OSγ) can be a challenge in its own right. In [15],
a reduction procedure for a special class of problems was developed that allowed the
application of a nonsmooth Newton method. This method was shown to converge
locally superlinearly for each γ in function space.
5. Applications. In section 5.1, we extend the numerical results of [15] to the
case of linear parabolic PDEs, and in section 5.2, we consider a spot market problem.
5.1. Solving a parabolic GNEP. A reduction step and a nonsmooth
Newton iteration. Consider the problem class in Example 2.4 in which the linear
operatorKi is merely the standard canonical embedding of the state space into L2(Q).
For β, we use the standard Moreau–Yosida regularization of the indicator function
for the state constraint, i.e., β(y) :=
∫
Q(y − ψ)2+dxdt = ‖(y − ψ)+‖2L2(Q).
In the following, we use α̃i = α
−1
i for readability and let (·)+ := max(0, ·) be un-
derstood pointwise almost everywhere. The setting of the problem under investigation
leads to the following first-order system associated with (Pγ) (cf. [29]):
ui = α̃iB
∗
i pi − (α̃iB∗i pi − bi)+ + (ai − α̃iB∗i pi)+,(12)
∂ty −Δy = Bu, y|∂Ω = 0, y(0) = 0,(13)
−∂tpi −Δpi = yid − y − γ(y − ψ)+, pi|∂Ω = 0, pi(T ) = 0.(14)
Note that y|∂Ω = 0 and y(0) = 0 are shorthand for the boundary and initial conditions
in Example 2.4. The same shorthand is analogously used for pi|∂Ω = 0 and pi(T ) = 0.
We assume that Ω is convex or C1,1.
Due to the form of this problem, we can reduce the number of variables when
solving this system. Indeed, we first observe that pi = p+ qi, where
−∂tp−Δp = −(y + γ(y − ψ)+), p|∂Ω = 0, p(T ) = 0,(15)
−∂tqi −Δqi = yid, qi|∂Ω = 0, qi(T ) = 0.(16)
Note that (16) depends solely on data; as such, it need only be calculated once. Hence,
if we define q̃i := α̃iB
∗




i p+ q̃i − (α̃iB∗i p− b̃i)+ + (ãi − α̃iB∗i p)+.
Let B(p) denote the nonsmooth operator (applied to p) obtained by substituting this
formula for ui into the vector u in the term Bu in (13). We then consider the reduced
system,
F1(y, p) := ∂ty −Δy − B(p) = 0, y|∂Ω = 0, y(0) = 0,(17)
F2(y, p) := −∂tp−Δp− (y + γ(y − ψ)+) = 0, p|∂Ω = 0, p(T ) = 0(18)
with F1, F2 : Y × Y → L2(Q). It can be argued, see, e.g., [12], that the system
(17)–(18) can be solved by using a nonsmooth Newton step as defined in [12, 13].
This implies in particular that for each γ, we have local superlinear convergence in
the space,
Y = {y ∈ L2(0, T ;H10 (Ω) ∩H2(Ω))|yt ∈ L2(0, T ;L2(Ω)},
upon invoking the usual boundedness assumptions on the Newton/slant derivative.
The controls ui are computed by substitution following the solution of (17) and (18).
Given y and p, we require Newton derivatives of B and (· − ψ)+ in order to set
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derivatives are as follows:
GB(p)δp = B(α̃i1χI1(p)B
∗
1δp, . . . , α̃iNχIN (p)B
∗





∣∣∣ãi(x) < α̃i(B∗i p)(x) < b̃i(x)} , A(y) := {x ∈ Ω |y(x) > ψ(x)} ,
and χ is the usual characteristic function, i.e., χS(x) = 1, if x ∈ S, and χS(x) = 0
else. Then, given an approximate solution pair (y, p) for (17) and (18), we solve at
each iteration of the semismooth Newton scheme the linear system in (δy, δp):
∂tδy −Δδy −GB(p)δp = −F1(y, p), δy|∂Ω = 0, δy(0) = 0,(19)
−∂tδp−Δδp+ δy + γχA(y)δy = −F2(y, p), δp|∂Ω = 0, δp(T ) = 0.(20)
Using an implicit Euler scheme to discretize (19)–(20), we arrive at the following
system:
Lτδyj+1 − τGB(pj+1)δpj+1 = δyj − τF1(yj+1, pj+1), δy0 = 0,(21)
Lτδpj + τδyj + τγχA(yj)δyj = δpj+1 − τF2(yj , pj), δpM = 0,(22)
where τ = 1/M is the uniform time-step size, j = 0, . . . ,M , and Lτ := I − τΔ.
Due to the regularity of the domain Ω, the solutions δpi, δyi of (21)–(22) satisfy δpi,
δyi ∈ H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω) for each i = 1, . . . , N . Hence, (21) and (22) can be understood
in L2(Ω). We then solve (21)–(22) using a forward-backward sweep until the residuals
of the equations (calculated using the L2-norm) are sufficiently small. We then set
y := y + δy, p := p + δp and check the residual of the time-discretized version of
(17)–(18). Due to the data assumptions, we may use the L2-norm to calculate these
residuals. Upon reaching the stopping tolerance, we increase γ and repeat the outer
iteration until γ satisfies a stopping criterion, which we specify later.
Numerical results. Throughout this subsection, we let N = 4 and Ω = (0, 1) ×
(0, 1). The Laplacian −Δ is discretized by finite differences using a standard 5-point
stencil and a uniform mesh with mesh size h. The penalty parameter γ was updated
following Algorithm 1 with πpath = 10
−5. Larger values of πpath, e.g., 10−2, may
lead to nonconvergence of the Newton iteration as no globalization is used. The
time interval [0, T ], T = 1, is partitioned into equidistant intervals using a time step
τ := 1/250.
We employ a nested-grid strategy for the space discretization by using a standard
9-point prolongation to pass from the coarse to the fine mesh; cf. [8]. Motivated by
elliptic control problems [10, section 4, Example 1], the mesh is refined as soon as
Cγ−1 > h2. We use C = 100 in our experiments.
The operator B is defined by Bu :=
∑4
i=1 χSiui, where χSi is the standard
characteristic function of the set Si ⊂ Ω given by
S1 = ]0, 0.5[×]0, 0.5[ , S2 = ]0.5, 1[×]0, 0.5[ , S3 = ]0, 0.5[×]0.5, 1[ , S4 = ]0.5, 1[×]0.5, 1[ .
We let ai ≡ −.1 and bi ≡ 1 for all i and set
ξ(x1,x2) := .98− cos(5
√
(x1 − 0.5)2 + (x2 − 0.5)2).
The upper bounded ψ for the state constraint is given by
ψ(x1,x2, t) :=
{
2(T2 − t)/T + ξ(x1,x2), t ∈ (0, T/2],
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(a) Update behavior of γ
















(b) γ versus total sweeps of (21)–(22)
Fig. 1. (Parabolic GNEP).
By first defining zd ∈ H10 (Ω) to be the solution of −Δzd = 1, which implies zd > 0 on
Ω, the desired states are given by
y1d = zd, y
2
d = −zd, y3d = −zd, y4d = zd.
Finally, we set αi = 1 for all i.
In our experiments, the nonsmooth Newton step converged for each γ in no more
than two steps with a system residual (discrete L2-norm in space-time) on the order
of 10−10. In Figure 1, we see the behavior of the γ-update as well as the total behavior
of the fixed point iterations for each fixed γ. Notice that the update scheme is initially
quite conservative but that the γ’s increase more than linearly as we near feasibility
in the state. The tolerance for the fixed point iteration, i.e., the forward-backward
sweep of (21)–(22) needed to determine (δy, δp), was set to 10−12. In (b), we note
that “iter” represents the total number of fixed point iterations over all the Newton
steps for a fixed γ. The spikes in the number of iterations correspond to those cases in
which two Newton steps were needed to solve the equilibrium problem. One also sees
that, on average, 8–10 fixed point iterations were needed for each Newton iteration.
In Figure 2, we have chosen a few time frames in the evolution of the controls
during which the lower bounds ai become partially active for each of the players; see
Figure 2, frames (c)–(e). The evolution of the state y∗ at equilibrium can be seen in
Figure 3, where activity happens around t = 124; see Figure 3(e).
According to the results in section 3.2, the search for a variational equilibrium in
this case is equivalent to the solution of a single control problem in which the sum of
the individual objective functions is minimized over L2(Q)4×Y with the four controls
acting on four separate regions of the domain Ω such that each control satisfies its own
box constraints and both the PDE as well as the state constraint are fulfilled. This is
most likely the reason for the encouraging numerical results. In the following section,
we develop an alternative method that can be applied regardless of the reducibility of
the search for a variational equilibrium; though convergence is not always guaranteed
if the problem is not reducible.
5.2. A simplified spot market model inspired by natural gas markets.
In this section, we consider a market model in which one vertically integrated producer
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(a) t = 0 (b) t = 100
(c) t = 110 (d) t = 120
(e) t = 125 (f) t = 130
Fig. 2. Evolution of equilibrium controls u∗ (parabolic GNEP).
pipeline. The product can be bought by wholesalers from the producer. Both the
producer and the wholesalers are assumed to have customer demands to satisfy over
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(a) t = 1 (b) t = 55
(c) t = 80 (d) t = 100
(e) t = 124 (f) t = 159
(g) t = 176 (h) t = 250
Fig. 3. Evolution of equilibrium state y∗ (parabolic GNEP).
5.2.1. Derivation of the model and formulation as a GNEP. Transport
and market structure. The pipeline is modeled by Ω := (0, 1). We assume a finite
time horizon [0, T ], T > 0, and set Q = (0, 1)×(0, T ). As before, we assume that there
are at least two agents. The vertically integrated producer is denoted by the subscript
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“0” and purchases on the market “1.” The dynamics on the pipeline are modeled by
the following parabolic system, which may be interpreted as a viscosity regularized
transport equation:
yt(x, t) + vyx(x, t) − εyxx(x, t) = 0, a.e. Q,(23a)




u1i (t), a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),(23c)
y(x, 0) = y0(x), a.e. x ∈ (0, 1).(23d)
Here, u0 : [0, T ] → R is the amount of product introduced into the system at the
production facility at time t. The functions u1i : [0, T ] → R, i = 0, . . . , N , represent
the amount purchased on the market at time t by agent i. The decision variables are
(u0, u10) for the producer and u
1
j , j = 1, . . . , N , for the wholesalers. We assume no
collusion and look for a Nash equilibrium. Note that v is a velocity constant which we
will henceforth take to be equal to 1 and ε > 0 is the viscosity parameter. Without
loss of generality, we set the initial distribution in the structure y0 ≡ 0. Moreover, we




i (t) ensures market clearing in the
sense that the amount of product arriving at time t equals the amount bought by the
wholesalers plus the amount sold by the producer. This might not mean, however,
that demand is met exactly.
Control constraints. Since u0 is a production quantity it is natural to impose the
following lower and upper bounds:
(24) 0 ≤ u0(t) ≤ ūp, a.e. t ∈ (0, 1),
where ūp > 0 is a scalar. Similarly we impose the purchasing capacity constraints
(25) 0 ≤ u1i (t) ≤ ūc,i, a.e. t ∈ (0, 1), i = 0, . . . , N.
where ūc,i > 0 is a scalar.
State constraints. We are interested in situations in which the total demand is
satisfied at each point in time. This leads to the state constraint:
(26) y(1, t) ≥
N∑
i=0
ud,i(t), a.e. t ∈ (0, 1),
where ud,i : [0, T ] → R is the aggregate demand of the ith agent’s customers over the
time period [0, T ]. The structure of the governing system ensures that the amount
taken out of the pipeline at point 1 does not exceed what is put into it at point 0:
(27) u0(t) ≥ y(1, t), a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
In addition, it is necessary that the amount of product in point x at time t is nonneg-
ative and that it does not exceed a certain capacity ȳc > 0, a positive scalar . This
yields
(28) ȳc ≥ y(x, t) ≥ 0, a.e. Q.
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(Dis)utility functions. We define cp(t) ≥ 0, cp ∈ L∞(0, T ), to be the cost of
production at time t and cm(t) ≥ 0 , cm ∈ L∞(0, T ), to be the price of product on the
market at time t. In addition, we let μi > 0, i = 0, . . . , N , be a penalty that each agent
must pay if their demand ud,i is not met exactly. For simplicity, we assume that the


























i (t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Revenue
.















i (t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Cost
, j = 1, . . . , N.
The development of the prices cp, cm on the markets will also be added in future
works.




















































































i (t)dt =: J0(u
0, u1, y).
The producer’s problem is given by
(29)
minimize J0(u
0, u1, y) over (u0, u10, y) ∈ L2(0, T )× L2(0, T )× Y
s.t.
(u0, u10) ∈ U0ad,
ȳc ≥ y(x, t), in (0, 1)× (0, T ),
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(v0, v1) ∈ L2(0, T )× L2(0, T )
∣∣0 ≤ v0 ≤ ūp,
a.e. (0, T ) 0 ≤ v1 ≤ ūc,0, a.e. (0, T )
}
.
Analogously, the wholesalers consider
(30)
minimize Jj(u
0, u1, y) over (u1j , y) ∈ L2(0, T )× Y
s.t.
u1j ∈ U jad,
ȳc ≥ y(x, t), in (0, 1)× (0, T ),





w ∈ L2(0, T ) | 0 ≤ w ≤ ūc,j, a.e. (0, T )
}
.
Together, (29) and (30) represent a GNEP that fits into the form in section 2. The only
missing aspect is the strict convexity in the decision variables u0 and u1. However,
this aspect is not needed in the proof of Theorem 3.4. Therefore, there exists a Nash
equilibrium for the GNEP defined via (29) and (30). Note also that the inclusion of
additional producers and pipelines only marginally changes the form of the current
problem.
Reduced form of the GNEP. In the following, we let E1, E0 : Y → L2(0, T ) be
the evaluation operators defined by E1w = w(1, ·) ∈ L2(0, T ) and E0w = w(0, ·) ∈
L2(0, T ) with w ∈ Y . Since the state space requires y(·, t) to be at least H1(0, 1) for
almost every t ∈ (0, T ), it follows from the Sobolev embedding theorem that E1, E0
are well defined. Due to the superposition principle, y can be written as









yt(x, t) + vyx(x, t)− εyxx(x, t) = a(x, t), a.e. Q,
y(0, t) = b(t), a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),
y(1, t) = c(t), a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),
y(x, 0) = d(x), a.e. x ∈ (0, 1)
with a ∈ L2((0, 1)× (0, T )), b, c ∈ L2(0, T ), and d ∈ H1(0, 1) we have the following:
1. SΓ0u
0 is the solution of (31) with a ≡ 0, b = u0, c ≡ 0, and d ≡ 0.
2. SΓ1u
1
i is the solution of (31) with a ≡ 0, b = 0, c = u1i , and d ≡ 0.
This allows us to rewrite (29) as
(32)
minimizeJ0(u0, u1) := J0(u0, u1, E1S(u0, u1)) over (u0, u11) ∈ L2(0, T )× L2(0, T )
s.t.
(u0, u10) ∈ U0ad, u
0(t) ≥ E1S(u0, u1) ≥
∑N
i=0 ud,j(t), a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),
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and (30) as
(33)
minimizeJj(u0, u1) := Jj(u0, u1, E1S(u0, u1)) over u1j ∈ L2(0, T )
s.t.
u1j ∈ U jad, u
0(t) ≥ E1S(u0, u1) ≥
∑N
i=0 ud,j(t), a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),
S(u0, u1) ≤ ȳc, a.e. Q.
Since E1S(u




j(t), the associated bilateral constraint in (33)
could be understood as a further control constraint. This would then amount to the
form of GNEP used throughout the paper.
5.2.2. Solving the GNEP. We now apply the method developed in section 4
for the computation of variational equilibria.





















‖(w − ȳc)‖2L2(Q), w ∈ L2(0, T ;L2(0, T )),
we obtain the γ-dependent NEP,
(34)
minimizeJ0(u0, u1) + γ(β1(E1S(u0, u1), E0S(u0, u1)) + β2(S(u0, u1))) over (u0, u10) ∈ L2(0, T )2
s.t. (u0, u10) ∈ U0ad,
and for j = 1, . . . , N ,
(35)
minimizeJj(u0, u1) + γ(β1(E1S(u0, u1), E0S(u0, u1)) + β2(S(u0, u1))) over u1j ∈ L2(0, T )
s.t. u1j ∈ U jad.
Due to the convexity and continuity of the objectives (with respect to their associated
decision variables) and the weak compactness of the feasible sets U0ad and U
j
ad, j =
1, . . . , N , it can be easily argued that there exists a Nash equilibrium to (34)–(35).
Reduction and optimality conditions. Although the current GNEP is structurally
more complex than the parabolic GNEP in the previous section, there is still a pos-
sibility to reduce the computational effort via a reduction step. We first introduce
adjoint variables, which are then used to illustrate a major difficulty in the develop-
ment of an algorithm. We then exploit the structure of the solution and evaluation
operators in order to write the optimality conditions as a system of coupled nonsmooth
equations of only the controls.
First, we define the adjoint state. Given some a ∈ L2(Q), let p be the solution of
(36)
−ψt(x, t)− ψx(x, t)− εψxx(x, t) = −a(x, t),
ψ(0, t) = 0, a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),
ψ(1, t) = 0, a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),
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(pt(x, t) + px(x, t) + εpxx(x, t))(S(v0, (v1, 0−0))(x, t)




px(1, t)(v1(t)− u10(t)) − px(0, t)(v0(t)− u0(t))dt.
Letting a(x, t) = γ(y(x, t)− ȳc)+, a.e. Q, we can then write the first-order optimality
































− cm(t) + εpx(1, t))(v1(t)− u10(t))dt ≥ 0
























+ εpx(1, t))(v1(t)− u1j(t))dt ≥ 0 ∀v1 ∈ U jad.
Setting v1 = u
1









− εpx(0, t))(v0(t)− u0(t))dt ≥ 0









+ εpx(0, t) ∈ N[0,ūp](u0(t)), a.e. t ∈ (0, T ),
or equivalently,
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Hence, using α = 1, we have

































Analogously, setting v0(t) = u
0(t) in (37), we obtain a structure similar to (40).
Similarly, we deduce from (38) that (for almost every t ∈ (0, T ))
(41)
u1j(t) = Φj(t, u
0(t), u1(t))+(−Φj(t, u0(t), u1(t)))+)+−(Φj(t, u0(t), u1(t))−ūc,j)+,
where
Φj(t, u


















We have thus demonstrated the following result.
Theorem 5.1 (characterization of Nash equilibrium). If (ū0, ū1) solves the
NEP (34)–(35), then ū0 satisfies (40) and ū1j satisfies (41), where y solves (23) with
(u0, u1) = (ū0, ū1) and p solves (36) with a(x, t) = γ(y(x, t)− ȳc)+.
We propose a type of projected gradient method, which we adapt to the GNEP
setting. Given some feasible (u0, u1) and an arbitrary ν > 0, we define (u0(ν), u1(ν))
as the projections onto the feasible sets for the NEPγ .
Algorithm 2. A projected gradient method for GNEPs.
Input: (u0, u1), res > tol > 0, ν = 1, σ, κ ∈ (0, 1), γ > 0, problem data.
1: while res > tol do
2: Calculate y by solving (23).
3: Calculate p using y from step 2.
4: Update (u0, u1) using (40) and (41).
5: for i = 0, . . . , N do
6: while J γi (u0(ν), u1(ν))− J γi (u0, u1)> −σν ||(u0(ν), u1(ν))− (u0, u1)||2L2(0,T )N+1
do
7: ν = κν
8: end while
9: end for
10: Set (u0, u1) = (u0(ν), u1(ν)).
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Table 1
Input data for Example 5.2.
h τ tol πpath γ0 ε N ȳc ūc ūp
1/256 1/200 1e-06 1e-05 1e+02 1e+00 3 3 1 3
Player 0 1 2
μ 65.2883 88.4484 25.7334
Fig. 4. State y at equilibrium in Example 5.2.
A full convergence analysis of this algorithm goes beyond the scope of this paper
and will be investigated in future works. Nevertheless, the algorithm performs quite
well in practice, i.e., similar to the projected gradient method for nonlinear programs,
when used with the path-following method developed in section 4. In the following,
we present and analyze the results of an implementation of Algorithm 2. We consider
cp ≡ 1 to be fixed in time. Given a discretization of the time interval, we assume that
the discrete market price cm is a random vector, which is uniformly distributed over
(0, 1.1). We generate samples of cm in the examples using the MATLAB function
rand().
Example 5.2. A three-agent market with randomized misfit costs μj and market
prices cm under periodic demand. In this example, we consider a three agent game
(one producer, two wholesalers) in which the misfit costs are asymmetric, the market
prices are randomly generated as described above, and the demand is periodic but
symmetric. The input data can be seen in Table 1.
This example was chosen so that there are coincident active sets for the control
constraints 0 ≤ u1j ≤ ūc,j, the state constraint y(x, t) ≤ ȳc (on a subset of the bound-
ary {1} × [0, T ]), and the state constraint y(1, t) ≥ ∑Ni=1 u1i (t), i.e., the constraints
are not redundant. The final state y can be seen in Figure 4. We observed that the
wholesaler attempts to behave strategically by producing more of the product than
is needed in periods of low-demand. We note that further experiments with smaller
ε yielded similar results. Counting (u0, u1, y, p) as free variables, we have solved a
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Fig. 5. γ versus updates in Example 5.2.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Convergence rates of u0 and u1 (bold) versus γ−1/2 (dashed-dotted) and γ−1 (dotted)
in Example 5.2.
The outer-loop/path-following scheme was observed to be initially very conser-
vative, generally updating by less than 1% of γ. With the increasing feasibility of
(u0, u1, y), however, the strategy became (predictably) more aggressive and selected
successively larger steps η; see Figure 5. The number of iterations needed for the
inner-loop, e.g., the projected gradient method, was generally stable with increases in
γ. However, as (u0, u1, y) became more feasible, more iterations were required. This
coincides with the typical behavior of steepest/gradient descent methods, in which
the number of iterations increases as the iterates approach the solution. In particular,
we observed “phases” in the number of inner iterations required for convergence. For
example, for γ ∈ (100, 150) an average of 4 iterations was needed, for γ ∈ (150, 625)
an average of 15, for γ ∈ (625, 2300) between 29 and 45 inner iterations, for γ ∈
(2300, 5000) roughly 54, etc. This behavior may be attributed to the fact that the con-
trol and state constraints are active on the same subsets of {0}×(0, T ) and {1}×(0, T ).
Finally, in Figure 6, we have plotted the convergence rates of u0(γ) → u0(γ∗)
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9870.5533 and γ0 = 100. In both cases, the convergence rate appears to be close to
o(γ−1).
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